My skeptical view: such an institute is justified only if it has a radically different funding and governance model from existing academies and agencies. Otherwise, it risks becoming another bureaucracy with a bold name.
Another important issue is that research funding is deeply shaped by structural motivations — often tethered to individual or group career metrics such as peer review and promotion concerns. In my role as a research coordinator, I’ve seen many excellent and necessary proposals that face uphill battles precisely because they aim to strengthen the “long tail” of networks and shared infrastructure. These kinds of projects rarely deliver immediate payoffs to a single lab or institution. Instead, they create the interstitial scaffolding — the connective tissue that allows individuals and organizations to meet, experiment, and innovate together. Yet because our evaluative systems tend to privilege direct, individualized returns, the very kinds of collective investments that make innovation possible often remain underfunded.
This will never fly as a federal institution. It doesn't matter if we as scientists understand that weird-sounding research can pay off in unexpected ways. Politicians don't understand that, and they don't care to learn. This would, however, be a great pilot for an independent institution funded by block grants, after which the federal government would have no further say in how the funding was spent.
As to the last point (scientists should be incentivized to honestly report on their failures and struggles), there is an interesting proposal in this Thakor/Lo paper (Optimal Financing for R&D-Intensive Firms): a put option concept as the incentive to re-frame puts the scientist and CFO in the same decision loop and would make decisions visible to use in future framing exercises.
My skeptical view: such an institute is justified only if it has a radically different funding and governance model from existing academies and agencies. Otherwise, it risks becoming another bureaucracy with a bold name.
Another important issue is that research funding is deeply shaped by structural motivations — often tethered to individual or group career metrics such as peer review and promotion concerns. In my role as a research coordinator, I’ve seen many excellent and necessary proposals that face uphill battles precisely because they aim to strengthen the “long tail” of networks and shared infrastructure. These kinds of projects rarely deliver immediate payoffs to a single lab or institution. Instead, they create the interstitial scaffolding — the connective tissue that allows individuals and organizations to meet, experiment, and innovate together. Yet because our evaluative systems tend to privilege direct, individualized returns, the very kinds of collective investments that make innovation possible often remain underfunded.
very interesting piece of information and suitable to teach to school students as well to get an idea of how science proceeds (or not proceeds!)
This will never fly as a federal institution. It doesn't matter if we as scientists understand that weird-sounding research can pay off in unexpected ways. Politicians don't understand that, and they don't care to learn. This would, however, be a great pilot for an independent institution funded by block grants, after which the federal government would have no further say in how the funding was spent.
As to the last point (scientists should be incentivized to honestly report on their failures and struggles), there is an interesting proposal in this Thakor/Lo paper (Optimal Financing for R&D-Intensive Firms): a put option concept as the incentive to re-frame puts the scientist and CFO in the same decision loop and would make decisions visible to use in future framing exercises.