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Mijail Demian Serruya's avatar

Berg's technical corrections to the February 7 notice are valid—the rate/recovery conflation was genuinely sloppy, and the unilateral cap was legally indefensible. But the piece inadvertently commits a category error worth naming: "these costs are real" ≠ "these costs are efficiently produced." Those are separate questions, and the second one never gets asked.

The deeper issue is incentive architecture. No compliance officer's performance metric is "reduced cost per grant dollar"—it's "zero audit findings" and "complete submissions." That's adversarial to efficiency by design. Once a compliance FTE line gets established, it generates its own justification, and nobody in the system is rewarded for repeal, only for reinforcement. Uniform indirect rates then pool labs with radically different actual compliance burdens, obscuring cross-subsidization that benefits the AMC's revenue model while remaining opaque to the investigator paying for it.

This is Yudkowsky's interlocking equilibria problem applied to institutional overhead: regulators add rules in response to visible fraud; AMCs over-respond with compliance layers; compliance offices multiply because the incentive is risk-avoidance not cost minimization; overhead locks in as fixed cost; higher rates are then "negotiated" between two parties who share an interest in opacity. There's no representative of the scientist or taxpayer at that table.

It's also Ezra Klein's Nader Raiders problem. The original regulatory expansions were genuinely reform-motivated. The cumulative sediment forty years later is a compliance regime whose administrative cost may substantially exceed its fraud-prevention value—and whose primary beneficiaries are the compliance infrastructure itself. That's not an argument for DOGE-style blunt-force cuts, which were a fiasco precisely because they ignored these distinctions. It's an argument for what DOGE should have been: menu-priced, line-item overhead transparency that switches the incentive from cost-maximization to cost-minimization. Small businesses and non-profits do this routinely.

The system isn't corrupt. It's misaligned. Those require different fixes.

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